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Banks and Venture Capitalists:
Are the New Rules Too Tough, Too Weak, or Just Right?
BRETT MCDONNELL

Our images are quite different. The venture capitalist-a modern
figure, dressed Banana Republic casual, high-tech, high-stakes-resides
in Silicon Valley. The bank [ending officer-formal dress, low-tech,
limited loans-resides in Main Street, USA.
White investing, venture capitalists and bankers encounter similar
problems. Deciding which young companies are most likely to flourish
can be very hard. Making sure that those companies which receive funds
are using their money wisely and in the interests of investors, not those
running the companies, can be even harder. In solving those problems,
bankers and venture capitalists use similar tools.
Similarities aside, they differ in important ways, too. Venture
capitalists make their investments in the form of equity, receiving shares
of stock in the firms in which they invest, or of debt convertible into
equity, while banks invest in debt, generally short-term. One important
reason for this difference is that under the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act, banks have been strictly limited in their
ability to invest in equity. That has changed significantly with the recent
17
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB" or the "Act").
How much have the limits on banks changed with GLB and the
Federal Reserve's regulations implementing it? Is that change for the
better?
Banks and Venture Capitalists: Handling the Challenges
As noted above, banks and venture capitalists have shaped similar
tools to handle the challenges of choosing and monitoring the companies
in which they invest. Both tend to specialize in companies of a particular
type for which the bank or venture capitalist has particular expertise.
Bank [ending officers are expert in the needs and contours of their local
economy. Venture capitalists specialize by industry.

Brett McDonnett is an associate professor of taw at the University of Minnesota
Law School.-He specializes in the fields of corporate law, securities regulation,
and law and economics.
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Both types of intermediaries have more specific strategies which
resemble each other. For instance, both use strategies of staged
investments. Making investments in stages, rather than all at once, gives
the receiving companies incentive to use the money well, increasing
their chances of receiving later stages. Also, it allows the investor to
update its information on how wise its investment choice has been and
to limit its losses if the choice turns out to be unwise.
Both banks and venture capitalists frequently negotiate detailed
covenants affecting many areas of governance of the companies in which
they invest. These covenants allow the investors to block many decisions
they find unwise or against their interests.
But banks and venture capitalists do differ, and one key
difference is that venture capitalists typically make equity investments
while banks make loans. Equity, as opposed to debt, is particularly wellsuited for investments in high-risk start-ups in the high-technology
sector. For such companies, the expected stream of future profits is
uncertain and variable-the companies may do extremely well, or they
may be a complete bust. Furthermore, intangible assets such as
intellectual property, reputation, and employee skill are often a high
percentage of total assets.
These two features make such companies poor candidates for
debt investment. On the one hand, if the new company crashes and
burns, the creditor will be able to recoup little from its investment, as
the lack of tangible assets leaves little to salvage from the wreckage. On
the other hand, if the new company soars, the creditor does not share in
the upside beyond receiving the fixed amount the company has promised
to repay.
For these reasons, investment in high-risk, high-technology
companies frequently takes the form of equity. Since outside
shareholders, who lack a contractual claim to a specified stream of
payments, are particularly vulnerable to managerial misuse of funds,
venture capitalists will frequently become actively involved in the dayto-day affairs of their portfolio companies, often by putting themselves
on the boards of those companies.
Why Don't Banks Take Equity Stakes?
When considering investing in such companies, why don't banks
follow the path of venture capitalists and make equity investments
rather than loans?
Once, at least some of them did. A century ago a few companies
which combined commercial banking and investment banking dominated
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American corporate finance: J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb,
and Company, First National Bank, National City Bank, and a few others.
Partners, directors, and officers in these banks held interlocking
directorates in many of the largest companies in the U. S. and also held
shares in those companies. In other countries, a fairly similar pattern
remains in place today, with Germany and Japan as the most notable
examples.
In the U. S., this era came to a close in 1933 with the GlassSteagall Act. That act prohibited banks and their subsidiaries from
owning shares in most kinds of non-financial companies and prohibited
commercial banks from underwriting or selling securities. 18 Later, the
Bank Holding Company Act stopped affiliates of banks within a holding
company structure from owning shares in non-financial companies, with
limited exceptions. 19
It may be that the GLB has changed all that. Before looking at the
new Act, though, I would ask whether there is any justification for the
regulatory scheme which began in 1933.
Should Banks Be Allowed to Take Equity Stakes?
The limits on investments by banks are at least troubling, and
require justification. After all, banks are a key source of funding for new
businesses. Banks have much experience in identifying promising new
companies and in monitoring their progress. Limiting the ability of banks
to become involved in some of the most dynamic areas of new business
may be a real loss to the economy. Perhaps bankers are not very
knowledgeable in the high-tech area and would not do well in
competition with expert venture capitalists. Then again, perhaps the
limited knowledge of bankers in this area is due to the old rules limiting
their ability to invest in equity, and with those rules removed, banks
could become valuable players in this area.
Even after companies in which a bank has invested have been
around for a while, a continuing role for banks in corporate governance
may still be useful. Even established public companies are often not well
run, and it is not clear that capital markets always do a good job of
disciplining them. J. P. Morgan a century ago, and Japanese and German
banks today, may help to monitor management. Increasingly those
interested in good corporate government in the U. S. took to large
institutional investors to oversee and discipline managers. If the law
allowed them, banks might be able to do this, too.
18

12 U.S.C. § 24.

19 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a), <http: //www4.taw.cornet. edu/uscode/12/1843.htmt>.
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Are there any good reasons for limiting the ability of banks to
compete with venture capitalists and institutional investors by making
equity investments? The main justification for the heavy regulation of
banks is the unique source of their capitat and the potent impact they
can have on the economy, for good and for itM.
Banks traditionally get their funds for making investments from
the deposits they hold. Depositors leave money with the bank, with the
promise that they can withdraw any or alt of it whenever they want.
Banks do not hotd this money in a vault somewhere, waiting to pay out
withdrawals. They know that not everyone is going to withdraw all of
their money at once-they only need to keep a fraction of funds
available to cover withdrawals. The money that they do not plan to keep
in place as reserves is available for the bank to invest.
However, this makes banks vulnerable to runs. If for some reason
many depositors think that a bank may be running out of money, they
may all try at once to withdraw their deposits. If the amount to be
withdrawn exceeds the bank's reserves, trouble ensues. Even the
soundest of banks is vulnerable, as all hold only a fraction of total
deposits available as reserves. If an epidemic of runs breaks out in an
economy, it can have devastating consequences. Consumers who have
lost their deposits cut back on spending. Businesses who can no longer
get loans lay off workers. The payment system, which runs through
banks, may break down. The economy can spiral downwards from there.
This was a central part of the dynamic which led to the Great
Depression.
Given this ever-present threat, long-term and iliquid investments
are problematic for banks. If a run develops or appears an imminent
possibility, the bank would like to be able to liquidate its investments to
quickly increase its reserves. If the bank is holding shares in a start-up
which is not publicly traded, the bank will find it very difficult to quickly
recoup the funds it has invested in that company. Holding shares in a
public company is less problematic, as the bank can sell its shares.
However, the bank runs the risk of a loss on its investment if it must sell
when shares prices are low, and if the bank holds a large fraction of a
company's shares, it may find those shares hard to sell except at a low
price.
This does not in itself justify governmental regulation prohibiting
banks from making equity investments. If there is such a risk, why not
allow bank managers to weigh that risk against the benefits of such
investments? There are two main answers. First, the risk of a run can be
contagious. If bad investments by one bank lead it to failure, that may
scare depositors even in healthy banks and lead to a run on them. Bank
managers have no incentive to take this effect into account. Second, in
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order to deal with the problem of runs, the U. S. in the 1930s created
deposit insurance, so that even if a bank fails, depositors in that bank
wilt be able to get back at least some of their deposits. This makes runs
less likely and less damaging. However, it creates an incentive problem
in the behavior of banks by encouraging them to make overly risky
investments-if the investments succeed, the bank makes greater
profits, and if they fail to the point of causing bank failure, the
government bears much of the cost of that failure. Governmental
regulation is justified as a way of limiting such risky behavior by bank
managers.
Even if persuasive, this argument does not yet justify prohibiting
all forms of bank-related equity investing. First, perhaps banks should be
able to invest some of their funds in equity, as long as such investments
are not too large a share of their total investing, so that the risk is
correspondingly limited. Second, banks have ways of limiting their
exposure to equity investments and yet still using their expertise to
become usefully involved in such investing. Rather than directly
investing themselves, banks can set up related companies which make
equity investments. These companies may be subsidiaries of the banks or
affiliates owned by a bank holding company which also owns the bank
itself. Investment by these related companies can then be funded by
sources other than bank deposits. Moreover, the use of a separate
corporation limits the liability of the bank to what it has invested. The
banks can still use their investing skill to determine the investments
their related companies make.
Such a structure gets around the direct problem created by bank
equity investing. It does raise, potentially, an indirect problem. Suppose
an affiliate of a bank has a large equity investment in a company. The
bank may have an incentive to make a loan to that company which is
overly risky to the bank on its own terms but which is worth it overall to
the bank because it improves the value of the affiliate's equity
investment. Equity investments by affiliates may, in this way, still lead
to overly risky lending by banks themselves.
This concern is a major traditional justification for both limiting
the ability of bank affiliates to make equity investments and for
regulating transactions and relationships between banks and their
affiliates. The concern may be somewhat valid and may justify some
degree of regulation and oversight. However, the problem under this
structure is less severe than where banks directly invest in equity. Other
mechanisms, for instance a bank's reputation, exist to limit overly risky
investing. Arrayed against the cost of overly risky investing is the benefit
to be gained from bank involvement in venture financing. Banks have
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much expertise to offer in this area, and they potentially offer to startups a greater smorgasbord of services than can venture capitalists.
Several different arguments consider bank equity investing may
harm the companies in which they invest or their competitors. One
argument is that if banks are allowed to have nonfinancial subsidiaries,
those subsidiaries wilt have an unfair advantage against their
competitors. Perhaps this argument had some plausibility back in the
days when many banks were local monopolies and product and service
markets were more local. Today, with more national markets and many
more sources of financing, this concern is uncompelling.
A slightly better argument is that if banks are given too much
control over a company, they may direct actions which help creditors
but hurt shareholders. Creditors tend to prefer that a company take too
tittle risk (relative to the value-maximizing standard), while
shareholders prefer that it take too much risk. Bank interests may thus
diverge from that of shareholders. However, if the banks hold a
significant equity stake in a company, their interests will diverge less
from that of other shareholders. Indeed, banks that hold both equity and
debt may have more incentive to maximize value than those who hold
either equity or debt atone.
Thus, there is probably good reason for restricting the ability of
banks themselves to make equity investments. However, bank
subsidiaries and affiliated companies should have a freer rein. Although
some regulation of bank relations with such affiliates, and loans to
companies affiliates have invested in, is appropriate, such regulation
should not be so heavy-handed as to preclude bank involvement in this
area. Do the new rules under GLB strike an appropriate balance?
How Does GLB Change the Terrain?
As mentioned above, prior to passage of GLB, banks and bankholding companies were quite limited in their ability to make equity
investments in non-financial companies. Under 12 U.S.C. section 24
(Seventh), national banks are prohibited from investing in most equity
securities. There are some exceptions, the most important of which is 15
U.S.C. section 682(b), which allows banks to acquire the stock of small
business investment companies, so long as the aggregate of such stock
owned by the bank does not exceed 5 percent of the bank's capital and
surplus. Through this provision large banks can engage directly in fairly
extensive venture capital investment, as long as they limit it to small
business investment companies. The 5 percent limit responds to the
safety and soundness concerns surrounding direct bank investment in
stock described above, although one can argue plausibly that 5 percent
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is an overly low limit. GLB does not change these rules limiting the
activities of banks themselves.
Traditionally, bank subsidiaries have been held to essentially the
same limits as banks themselves. GLB does not realty change thisindeed, it reinforces the point. 20 The Act provides (in section 122) that
five years after it becomes effective the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury Department may adopt rules which altow bank subsidiaries to
engage in the activities described below which GLB permits to holding
company affiliates. This provision was a compromise.
The Federal Reserve and the House wanted to limit equity
investing to holding company affiliates, white the Treasury and the
Senate wanted to allow bank subsidiaries to engage in the same
activities as affiliates. It is not clear whether there is any real policy
advantage to allowing affiliates but not subsidiaries to engage in these
activities. What is clear is that the Fed regulates holding company
affiliates while the Treasury regulates subsidiaries of national banks. The
agency positions become easier to understand once that fact is taken
into account.
That brings us to the heart of the change under GLB- holding
company affiliates of banks. For a tong time banks have been allowed to
establish a structure such that a parent company owns both the bank
and some other corporations. The Bank Holding Company Act has limited
what type of companies can be affiliated with a bank through this
structure. GLB altows banks that meet specified conditions to form
financiat holding companies, which are allowed to engage in some
activities not altowed mere bank holding companies. The new 12 U.S.C.
section 1843(k)(4)(H) allows financial holding company affiliates of banks
to engage in "merchant banking," which is essentially venture capitatike equity investment.
Section 1843(k)(4)(H) imposes two limits on merchant banking
activity. Subsection (iii) provides that such investments may only be held
"for a period of time to enable the sale or disposition thereof on a
reasonable basis consistent with" the merchant banking activities.
Subsection (iv) provides that the bank affiliate may not "routinely
manage or operate such company or entity except as may be necessary
or required to obtain a reasonable return on investment upon resale or
disposition." In addition, pre-existing limits on transactions between
banks and affiliates, embodied in sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act, remain in place. The issue then becomes whether these
three sets of restrictions on merchant banking activity have achieved an
appropriate regulatory balance.
20

12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(A), <http://www4.taw.corneL.edu/uscode/12/24a.htm>.
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Investment Time Limits
The wording of subsection (iii) is fuzzy: how long is tong enough to
enable the sale of the stock on a reasonable basis? This fuzziness could
hurt investment decisions by bank-affiliated companies by creating
uncertainty as to how long they may hold on to stock. Luckily, the
Federal Reserve has created a regulation which provides greater clarity.
In February 2001, the Fed and the Treasury promulgated a final
rule governing merchant banking investments allowed by GLB. Under the
final rule, the Fed said that a bank affiliate may hold an investment for
up to 10 years, and an interest in a private equity fund for up to 15
years. Companies may go beyond these periods only with the Fed's
permission.21
The Fed's regulations provide a much more bright line rule than
GLB itself. Considered in the light of standard venture capital practice,
the time limits are reasonable-a venture fund would rarely hold a
portfolio company for longer than 10 years, and funds rarely last longer
than 15 years. A better approach might have been to make the specific
periods safe harbors, so that a company could go beyond the time period
without having to get Fed approval, although it would make its position
uncertain. This would provide more flexibility while still providing a
clear safe ground.
A more basic question is why any limit on length of investment is
required at all. GLB seems designed to respond to the venture capital
model, where venture capitalists invest in new companies for a limited
time; help those companies either go public, get acquired, or go bust;
and leave. This model is a fine one, and it makes sense to allow bank
affiliates to compete in this market. However, the experience of J.P.
Morgan, Germany, and Japan suggests that banks can provide helpful
services even for longstanding public companies and aid in corporate
finance and governance even beyond the start-up period. Why not allow
banks to play this continuing role if they choose? How does the
investment time limit help safeguard against any of the legitimate
concerns about bank investment in equity?
Routine Management and Operation
Subsection (iv) creates a potentially more serious ambiguity.
Venture capitalists often take a hands-on approach to the governance of
their portfolio companies. Monitoring and advising the managers of such
companies is one of the main functions venture capitalists serve. If bank
affiliates are seriously limited in how much of this they can do, they will
21

12 C.F.R. §§ 225.172, 225.173,

<http: / /www.access. po.qov/nara/cfr/waisidx 01/12cfr225 01.html>.
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be at a distinct disadvantage relative to venture capitalists. Even if the
rules are simply uncertain rather than clearly prohibitive, this could
cause bank affiliates to limit themselves or cause them to engage in
costly legal consultation.
GLB itself is vague here. When does someone "routinely manage
or operate" a company? When does it become necessary to routinely
manage in order "to obtain a reasonable return on investment?" GLB
does not answer these questions, and one can imagine a large number of
possible answers.
Fortunately, the Fed's final rules provide more guidance. The
rules list a variety of situations which constitute routine management,
and a variety which do not.
Relationships which do not constitute routine management
include:
" Bank representation on a company board;
" Covenants concerning activities outside the ordinary course
of business, including the acquisition of significant assets,
significant changes to the company's business, removal of
executive officers, redemption of securities, and
amendments to the articles and bylaws; and
"

Advisory, underwriting, or consulting services.22

The rules also list some relationships which do constitute routine
management:
" Employees of the bank affiliate serving as executive
officers of the company;
" Executive officers of the bank affiliate servicing as officers
or employees of the company; and
"

Covenants restricting routine business decisions.2 3

The Fed's rules also provide some guidance as to when routine
management may be "necessary or required to obtain a reasonable

22

12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d).

<http: / /www.access.gpo. gov/ nara/cfr/waisidx 01/12cfr225 01 .htm[>
23
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return on investment upon resale or disposition," such as when the
company:
" Experiences a significant operating loss; or
"

Loses senior management.24

Once action is taken to deal with the problem, the bank affiliate
must stop its routine management. If such management lasts more than
nine months, it must notify the Fed.
Given the constraints of GLB, the Fed's rules appear reasonable,
though one can always quibble with details. The rules provide somewhat
more clarity and certainty, although some examples of what do and do
not count as routine management contain weasel words like
"significant" and "routine," which re-introduce a degree of vagueness.
The bigger problem, again, ties with the GLB [imitation itself. Why
should bank affiliates be barred from routine management of portfolio
companies? How would such management increase the risk the banks
face? Is there any reason to believe banks would be more prone to make
bad loans to companies in which their affiliates become involved in
routine management than to companies in which their affiliates have
comparable investments but are not involved in routine management?
Indeed, wouldn't active involvement in routine management, where
helpful to the portfolio company, actually decrease the risk of losses by
improving the company's performance?
The routine management limit may arise from concern that banks
may direct behavior in a way that privileges the interests of creditors
over shareholders. However, as analyzed above, so tong as banks have
substantial interests as both creditors and shareholders, the conflict is
lessened. Indeed, entities holding both debt and equity may well have a
better incentive to maximize value created than those who hold just
equity or just debt.
Sections 23A and 23B
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act place a variety of
limits on transactions between banks and their "affiliates." The limited
transactions include extending credit, issuing guarantees, purchasing
assets, accepting securities as collateral, and investing in securities. The
total value of such transactions with any one affiliate cannot exceed 10
percent of the bank's capital. The total of such transactions with all
24

12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e).
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affiliates combined cannot exceed 20 percent of the bank's capital.
Transactions must be secured 100 percent or more by collateral, and
banks cannot buy low-quality assets from affiliates.25 Banks must deal
with affiliates on terms "that are substantially the same, or at least as
favorable to such bank . . . as those prevailing at the time for
comparable transactions with or involving other non-affiliated
companies.26
These limitations directly address the most legitimate worries
raised by bank-related companies making equity investments. The
percentage limits help assure that even if banks have incentive to make
dubious deals with companies in which they have an equity stake, those
deals will not commit too much of the bank's capital. The collateral
requirement limits the risk posed by a transaction with a portfolio
company. The requirement that transactions be substantially the same
or at least as favorable to the bank as transactions with non-affiliates,
while somewhat vague, does give bank regulators a tool for policing
transactions with affiliates.
An important question, then, is when do these rules apply to
transactions with the portfolio companies of a merchant-banking
affiliate of a bank. The rules apply to any company "that is controlled by
the company that controls the member bank.", 27 Under section 23A, a
company has been deemed to have control over another company if it
has the power, "directly or indirectly, or acting through one or more
other persons" to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting
securities of that other company. 28 It would seem that if the merchantbanking affiliate owns at least 25 percent of the voting shares of any
class of securities of a portfolio company, that portfolio company
becomes an affiliate, and transactions with it are covered by the rules of
sections 23A and 23B.
In addition, GLB added a new provision for merchant banking
portfolio companies, creating the rebuttable presumption that if a
company owns 15 percent or more of a the equity capital of a portfolio
company, it controls that company.29
This definition of an "affiliate" probably goes as far as is needed.
If the investment of a bank affiliate in a portfolio company is under 15
percent of the equity capital of that company and under 25 percent of
12 U.S.C. § 371c, <http://www4.Law.corne[Ledu/uscode/12/371.htmL>.
U.S.C. § 371c-1, <http://www4.taw.cornett.edu/uscode/12/371 .htmt>.
27 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)(A), <http://www4.law.corne[Ledu/uscode/12/371.htmL>.
28 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(3)(A), <http://www4.law.corneL.edu/uscode/12/371.html>.
25
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12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(11), <http://www4.taw.corne[Ledu/uscode/12/371.html>.
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the voting power of all classes of voting securities, then it is unlikely
that the bank wilt have a perverse incentive to make bad loans to that
company.
Still Too Tough, But an Improvement
For decades, American law has strictly limited the role banks and
their affiliates can play in financing and governing new companies, by
limiting the ability of banks to make equity investments. There are
decent reasons for some limits on bank equity financing, but not for the
limits which have prevailed in the U. S. since the 1930s.
As long as bank deposits are federally insured, there is a good
argument for capping direct equity financing by banks themselves. Since
Glass-Steagall the law has done so, with a 5 percent exemption, and GLB
does not change this. It might be desirable to raise the rather low limit
and extend it beyond small business investment companies, but some
such cap is defensible.
The argument for limiting equity investments by bank subsidiaries
or affiliates is less strong. Such investments may create incentives to
make some bad loans, but the limits on transactions with affiliates
imposed by section 23A and 23B go most if not all of the way to
regulating those incentives. Little if any additional regulation is needed
beyond this.
Even after GLB, regulation goes too far. Bank subsidiaries are still
treated differently than holding company affiliates-this may change
after 5 years of the Act being effective, but given the Fed's ability to
block such regulatory change, I wouldn't hold my breath. GLB's limits on
holding periods and routine management of portfolio companies are also
unnecessary. Still, GLB has gone a long way toward leveling the playing
field and allowing banks to compete with venture capitalists.
The remaining excessive limits may impede some bank entry into
the field but not enough to have a terribly strong effect. One hopes that
as we gain experience with bank involvement in merchant banking,
Congress and the Fed will become willing to go even further.
It's too soon to tell how much of a difference more bank
involvement in venture capital financing will make. The law does give us
a better chance to see what they can do.

